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Abstract—We overview how sensorimotor experience can be
operationalized for interaction scenarios in which humanoid
robots acquire skills and linguistic behaviours via enacting a
“form-of-life”’ in interaction games (following Wittgenstein) with
humans. The enactive paradigm is introduced which provides a
powerful framework for the construction of complex adaptive
systems, based on interaction, habit, and experience.
Enactive cognitive architectures (following insights of Varela,
Thompson and Rosch) that we have developed support social
learning and robot ontogeny by harnessing information-theoretic
methods and raw uninterpreted sensorimotor experience to
scaffold the acquisition of behaviours.
The success criterion here is validation by the robot engaging
in ongoing human-robot interaction with naive participants
who, over the course of iterated interactions, shape the robot’s
behavioural and linguistic development. Engagement in such
interaction exhibiting aspects of purposeful, habitual recurring
structure evidences the developed capability of the humanoid to
enact language and interaction games as a successful participant.
I. OVERVIEW
As part of the international RobotCub consortium that
created the iCub humanoid as an open platform for cog-
nitive systems research and in subsequent work, over the
past 9 years in the Adaptive Systems Lab at the University
of Hertfordshire, we have developed the notion of extended
sensorimotor experience for robots interacting with their en-
vironment, including the social environment as a basis for
the development of artificial intelligence via the acquisition of
new skills and behaviours. Experience is operationalized as the
temporally extended flow of information across sensory, motor
and internal variables mediating interaction.1 Such raw unin-
terpreted experience can be used with biologically plausible
information-theoretic methods to self-structure sensory fields,
and derive dynamical regularities relating motor actuation to
what will be sensed, resulting in actively guided perception
and action (e.g. the discovery of optical flow and the capacity
for visually guided movement [1]).
1This is not the same as phenomenological experience. NB: Operationalized
experience cannot be directly and unproblematically equated with phenomeno-
logical experience.
Fig. 1. Drawing Hands by M.C. Escher, 1948, Lithograph. (Fair use of low
resolution image from [6] under U.S. copyright law.)
Without employing any notion of representation or static,
truth-functionalist semantics, on several robots and humanoids
we have harnessed enactive cognitive architectures based on
interaction histories and shown that such temporally extended
experiences can structure the acquisition of self-regulating
skills such as turn-taking games in social engagement [2],
[3], with the acquisition of new behaviours, and the dynamic
switching between them adaptively depending on details of
ongoing interactions with humans [4], [5].
Experience, thus operationalized, in turn shapes subsequent
action and interaction, which in turn shapes the developmental
trajectory of further experience (cf. M.C. Escher’s image of
hands drawing each other – Figure 1), as “paths are laid down
in the walking”, for habits and skills as the robot explores its
embodiment, and physical and social world.
This approach has also been employed in the acquisition
of rudimentary linguistic capabilities in humanoids in the
ITALK project [7] which harnesses mutual scaffolding in a
circular feedback cycle between social learning, individual
Fig. 2. The University of Hertfordshire iCub, DeeChee (centre), acquires
capability to use words meaningfully based on sensorimotor experience,
linguistic and social interaction using an enactive cognitive architecture with
Dr. J. Saunders (left) and Prof. C. L. Nehaniv (right). (Photo by Pete Stevens)
learning, and linguistic behaviours acquired in long-term in-
teraction with humans. The approach synthesizes ideas of
Wittgenstein on language as meaningful only in the context
of use in interaction games [8] with the enactive approach
of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch [9]. Furthermore, this is
grounded by relying heavily on rigorous mathematical and
information methods (esp. Shannon information theory [10])
applied to our operationalized notion of experience to achieve
ontogeny through establishing, engaging in, and modifying
habitual activity, via repeated interactions with humans, that
lead to informational self-structuring of the robot’s ongoing
sensorimotor experience as a basis for unfolding action and
interaction in a virtuous circle of development. (See references
cited below for technical details.)
II. ENACTIVE PARADIGM
A. What is Enactivism?
Enactive cognitive science has been originally formulated
by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in
their 1991 book The Embodied Mind [9]. Unsatisfied either
with cognitivism or connectionism, Varela and colleagues
sought to overcome the limitations of approaches that restrict
consideration of the organism to just its brain on the one hand
and that objectify the environment on the other.
To achieve the transcendence of the dualistic dichotomies,
the enactive approach emphasizes the interaction of the em-
bodied organism with its environment. It disposes of the
notions that the organism constructs symbolic representations
of the (objective) world and manipulates these representations
to guide its actions. Instead, it is the purposeful activity of
the embodied organism that brings forth a world of meaning.
Thus, at the heart of the enactive approach is an ongoing
interplay between biology and phenomenology - dual, but not
dualistic. Enactivism is also an approach to understanding and
synthesizing living and life-like systems, including cognitive
robots and understanding humans and animals constructively.
Several defining features of an enactive approach include:
• Embodiment (structural coupling with the world) is the
basis of activity and interaction, including social interac-
tion. The agent and environment mutually perturb each
other’s state and dynamics, even affecting their structure
in the course of time.
• Experience and interaction are the central focus of study.
• Dynamics of interaction cut across agent/
other/environment boundaries.
• There are no static entities, only processes. Phenomena
can’t be pinned down in an ‘objective” manner, indepen-
dent of any observer, but are co-dependently originating
processes.
• At the basic level, the enactive paradigm presumes no
reliance on propositional logic (a highly derived abstrac-
tion), nor reliance on representation.
• An enactive cognitive system functioning well becomes
part of an ongoing world, or gives rise to a world through
enaction (its activity). Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in
The Embodied Mind [9], quoting a poet, describe this
fact of how worlds of life and experience come to be in
historical processes as “Laying down a path in walking”.
• Social interaction and intersubjectivity: Others are part of
the environment and interaction with them is as primary
as with the rest of the environment.
• Developmental perspective: ontogeny is implicit since we
are talking about dynamical systems that modify their
structure. As a result, the role for habitual activity, long-
term interaction, and continual change are central.
• Interaction Games and Language Games (cf. Wittgen-
stein [8]) : an enactive system is working if it participates
in its world effectively. For example a robot initiates and
maintains social engagement with humans, acquires the
capacity to use some linguistic skills through interaction,
and then uses language to manipulate the world (includ-
ing its social world) and to participate in language games.
• Enactive cognitive systems actively create, maintain, and
regulate their own ways of being in and manipulating the
world (including the social world), rather than merely
tuning parameters in some innate or otherwise pre-given
models.
B. What can the enactive approach tell us about human
cognition that can’t be explained by other theories?
Other theories miss the role of experience, or have to use
a pre-given ontological framework to deal with it. They carve
up the world in static ways, while the dynamics of interaction
cuts across these forced/reified distinctions. Intertwining of
perception-action is missed by other theories that pre-suppose
they are separate stages.
This not only does not reflect how things are organized
in nature, but it is also very expensive in terms of required
resources and often completely infeasible. On the other hand,
enactive methods can often achieve predictive and explana-
tory power missing from traditional models. Examples from
cognitive science below illustrate this.
For human cognition, the enactive paradigm is yet to
develop a detailed understanding of higher-order cognition,
although some inroads are being made in psychiatry, child
development and linguistic development.
C. Benefits for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Research
The enactive viewpoint
• allows one to avoid modelling : agent, environment, and
the sense-plan-act approach based on updating world
models (e.g. of traditional cognitive science and AI).
• allows one to avoid shoehorning cognition into some form
of representation manipulation and / or logical inference.
(These are in no sense primary, and usually unnecessary.)
• can often lead one to constructive and effective mech-
anisms to achieve a working implementation of the
phenomenon or behaviour under study, or lead to the
identification of gaps in theoretical understanding that are
revealed by an attempted implementation.
D. What is the evidence supporting these ideas?
Much evidence showing the power of the enactive approach
has been accumulating over the last decades.
Neuroscientific evidence of self-processes as transient
modes of activation [11] supports an enactivist interpretation
of these. Specifically, the work on the Default Mode Network
(DMN) of the brain which appears to be associated with
self-referential processing [12] shows that the DMN, mainly
comprising midline regions of the brain, including medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate (PC) is
relatively more active during what Buckner and Carroll [13]
have called self-projection: remembering the past, thinking
about the future, or thinking about other minds (theory of
mind). It is also more active during mind-wandering [14],
narrative self-processing [15]. The same network is relatively
less active when the individual is engaged in solving cognitive
tasks or switch to modes of self-experience which are more
sensory based (embodied) and do not have a rigid self-other
boundary [15], [16]. Overall, the neuroscience evidences that
there is interplay of transitory self-processes that functionally
arise in a context-dependent manner depending on nature of
human-environment interaction.
Operational or sensorimotor experience in meaningful inter-
actions plays an important but non-exhaustive role in accounts
of mind. Deep issues of the nature of experience and cognition
are uncovered by adopting an enactive viewpoint. Operational
mastery of sensorimotor laws in agent’s experience and the
particularities of enacting this mastery in the world have
been argued by J.K. O’Regan and A. Noe¨ to account for the
particular character of that experience [17], [18]. In contrast
to traditional approaches that regard sensing as a passive
mechanism serving to build a up a world-model within the
brain, the enactive sensorimotor approach is able to yield a
much better explanatory and predictive understanding of, say,
vision. Traditional approaches require elaborate mechanisms
for the internal construction and maintenance of continually
updated and corrected representations that should function
despite the structure of the sensory apparatus and embodiment
(e.g. “correct” for the blind-spot in the human retina). By
taking an enactive sensorimotor approach that, instead, seeing
(and perception generally) are about interacting with world,
one is able to better explain and make predictions concerning
such phenomena as sensory substitution, change blindness,
inattentional blindness, localization of touch, colour naming
and colour perception, and other phenomena of perception
[18].
Activity of the organism in interaction within its environ-
ment, rather than a brain-limited process, may be a better
account for mind than the crude computer-science metaphor-
laden notions prevalent in much of cognitive science, iden-
tifying the mind either with the brain or as “software”
that is “running” on the brain. Alternatives evidencing the
explanatory power of enactive paradigm in various fields
include, for instance, D. Noble’s The Music of Life [19] for
systems biology, physiology and remarks on skills (such as
musicianship); versions of the extended mind hypothesis (e.g.,
Noe¨ [20]) for cognition and conscious experience; or notions
of Maturana and Varela equating doing and knowing [21]; as
well as studies in intersubjectivity and social cognition [22]
(cf. also early studies by Trevarthen [23] and Kaye [24]).
Constructive enactive approaches lend themselves to create
artifacts that achieve or model behaviours and processes of
interest. Systems can be built using these ideas that work,
and avoid representation, truth-functional propositional logic
and semantics, any need to construct an ontology or use
explicit internal modelling. For example these are properties of
the simple, robust behaviour-based robots of Rodney Brooks
[25], [26], which use none of these. Closely engaging with
the environment including the social environment enacts in-
teraction and experience in a ‘strange loop’ influencing or
even producing the structures and dynamics of the agent,
environment and others in environment. Such approaches are
now being scaled up to more human-like cognition, such
as in the EU-funded RobotCub project (2004-2010), which
explicitly sought to follow an enactive approach to the on-
togeny of cognition from its inception [27], [28], informed
awareness of constructive minimal social robotics [29], [30]
and by notions of achieving different kinds and degrees of
embodiment [31]. The RobotCub Consortium, in which the
University of Hertfordshire as AI partner focused on human-
robot interaction and ontogeny of behaviour, created the hu-
manoid iCub. In that project and subsequent work on FP7
ITALK project (2008-2012) working with our iCub, DeeChee,
such enactive methods were applied to achieve maintenance
and regulation of social interaction with human participants,
acquisition and scaffolding of new skills via social learning
[5], [32]; acquisition of phonetic word-forms [33]; acquisition
of linguistic skill (analogous to two-word stage in human
children: [34], [35], etc.); and acquisition of some forms
of linguistic negation [36], [37]. Moreover, there is growing
evidence that enacting appropriate contingent, nonverbal en-
gagement in social learning scenarios scaffolds the interaction
in such a way that learning can proceed better [38], [39].
E. Varieties of Enactivism
At present, the enactive paradigm brings together radical
insights from philosophy, behaviour-based artificial intelli-
gence, experiential intelligence, embodiment, sensorimotor
theory, and primary intersubjectivity, development and social
interaction. It exists in various forms. Origins, maintenance,
and regulation of interactive processes, dependently originated
boundaries and habit are central. Radical enactivism com-
pletely rejects the idea that propositional content is necessary
for basic cognition [40]. Closely related are approaches that
are exploring interaction as a basis for computation [41].
The enactive viewpoint encompasses an powerful framework
in which to understand cognition, behaviour and intelligent
activity, using interaction and experience, but also unifies all
of this with the study of biology (see, e.g. [42]), and hence can
serve as a useful framework for artificial life and a constructive
generalized biology.
III. THE EXPERIENCE OF A ROBOT
We operationalize experience as the flow of activitation of
sensorimotor and internal variables [3], [43], [44] of an agent
interacting with its environment, including other agents around
it.
For any pair of jointly distributed random variables (sensors)
X and Y of the robot, the conditional entropy H(X|Y ) of X
given Y is the amount of uncertainty (in bits) that remains
about the value of X given that the value of Y is known, and
is given by
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log2
p(x, y)
p(y)
,
where p(x, y) is the joint distribution of X and Y .2 The
information distance between X and Y is then defined as
d(X,Y ) = H(X|Y ) +H(Y |X),
and is mathematically a metric satisfying the triangle in-
equality, symmetric, etc., giving a geometry on information
sources [45].
This metric has been used to do sensorimotor reconstruction
to enable robots to construct sensory fields and acquire the
ability to control their own actuators to achieve desired effects
in sensing via the discovery of sensorimotor laws, such as
optical flow due to turning the neck and head [1] without
prior knowledge of the sensors and effectors.
Given the above definition we can operationalize an agent’s
experience from time t over a temporal horizon of h time units
as E(t, h) = (X1t,h, ..., X
N
t,h) where {X1, · · · , XN} is the set
of all sensorimotor (or other) variables available to the agent
and each Xit,h is the random variable estimated from the values
of Xi over a temporal window of length h beginning at time
2By convention, any terms mentioning a zero probability event are not
included in the summation in computing entropy. For instance, this prevents
any problem taking logarithms if p(y) or p(x, y) is zero in the formula given
here for conditional entropy.
t (1 ≤ i ≤ N ). We can then define a metric, the experience
metric D, on experiences of temporal horizon h, as
D(E,E′) =
N∑
k=1
d(Xkt,h, X
k
t′,h),
where E = E(t, h) and E′ = E(t′, h) are experiences of
an agent at time t and t′ over horizon h and d is the infor-
mation distance. Alternatively, one can define a cross-modal
experience metric D′, by taking all the information distances
between all the sensorimotor variables and summing these
[46]. This puts (operationalized) experiences in a geometric
space.
Using this metric an agent can compare its current and
previous experiences, and select actions (probabilistically) in
the light of their previous results in similar contexts, or when a
skill or behaviour has been mastered, the agent can explore at
the boundary of its capabilities (cf. Vygotsky’s notion of “zone
of proximal development” [47]). By using temporally extended
experiences to guide action and interaction, we have grounded
episodic intelligence in artificially constructed enactive agents
that grow, develop, and adapt their cognitive structures with a
broader temporal horizon.
IV. ONTOGENY: DEVELOPMENT OF BEHAVIOURS AND
SELECTION BASED ON SOCIAL CUES
Using an enactive cognitive architecture based on opera-
tionalized experience, several generations of the Interaction
History Architecture have been developed by N. Assif Mirza
and by Frank Broz working in our group at the University
of Hertfordshire.3 Figure 3 shows a schema for the basic
Interaction History Architecture.
Using social cues such as turn-taking in various modalities,
detection of social engagement, and feedback from vocal,
face- and gaze interaction to help acquire and select action,
these cognitive architectures have allowed robots to acquire be-
haviours such as predictive gaze and peek-a-boo [2]. Moreover,
on the basis of social feedback our humanoids have first devel-
oped distinct interactive drumming behaviour and peek-a-boo
interactive behaviours, and then were able to autonomously
switch between these behaviours, depending on social cues
and engagement with a human interaction partner [4], [5].4 In
our experiments, notably, peek-a-boo turning-taking behaviour
could not be stably acquired if action selection is random,
i.e. not based on prior experience, or if the temporal horizon
of experiences is too small or too large [2], [5], and the
same is true for interactive drumming which additionally
required short-term memory of recent social engagement to
be acquired [5]. This milestone work in embodied artificial
intelligence using human-robot interaction exhibits for the first
time together both (1) autonomous behaviour ontogeny and (2)
switching between acquired behaviors in response to social
contingency [4].
3The software developed and used in this work is available open-source at
http://sourceforge.net/projects/robotcub/ .
4See http://eris.liralab.it/misc/icubvideos/ihaNew short2 web.mov for
demo video.
Fig. 3. Interaction History Architecture (IHA), a basic form of enactive
cognitive architecture, selecting actions on the basis of prior experiences (see
text) and as a result modifying subsequent experience. The node labelled
‘robot’ comprises actuation whereby the ‘strange loop’ between the robot’s
experience and action interfaces and interacts with the environment, manipu-
lating or shaping the subsequent environment, including people in it, as well
as subsequent interaction. NB: This basic form of IHA shows a continual
ongoing developmental process, giving rise to a long-term trajectory through
recurring habits, experience and dynamics. No explicit modelling, semantics,
or representation are employed. There is no separation of development
into artificial training and testing phases; instead, learning, experiencing
and development are intertwined and ongoing. Actions or behaviours are
selected probabilistically based on the agent’s own assessment of their quality
and environmental feedback (including social engagement), but also low-
rate background chance random selection of actions leads to iterated cycles
of exploration at the boundary of current behaviours, mastered skills, and
activities. (Schematic drawing of the basic architecture from (Mirza et al. [3])
– for the most recent Extended Interaction History Architecture (EIHA), see
[5].)
V. LANGUAGE GAMES AND INTERACTION GAMES
Linguistic development takes place in children over years,
involving long histories of interaction in various contexts in
which regularities and habits are engaged in and re-engaged
despite many changes in manner that involves deep familiarity
with interaction partners, contexts, and practical needs. For
example, for a child, contexts such as bedtime, or eating
together as a family (e.g., breakfast), bath-time, car journey,
play with siblings or caretakers; making a puzzle; playing
monopoly with a sibling; helping with a chore; arguing with
siblings for a toy, or with parents for a reward; playing peek-
a-boo; drumming and singing together; etc., may provide the
framework in which language development occurs, together
with the development of action and social skills. To achieve
developmental learning of action and language in habitual
contexts, we can make use of philosopher Ludwig Wittgen-
stein’s insight on language deployed in embodied contexts and
his notion of language games, which we have generalized to
interaction games to emphasize also the role on non-verbal
action, behaviour and manipulation in social contexts [2]–[5],
[35], [44], [48], [49].
In the growth of intersubjective intelligence, as with human
children, a typical scenario involves the contact of a learning
agent with the context of a new interaction game (i.e., new to
the learner) which other persons or social agents are already
engaged in. Behaviourally, this “form of life” is manifested by
their practice of some unknown set of skills together with some
linguistic behaviour. Participants in a language manipulate the
world of the game and others in it, via actions and utterances.
Entry into the interaction game is entry into a form of life
based on action, language and interaction, e.g. workers on a
construction site might yell ‘slab’, ‘board’, ‘hammer’ to one
another, or bring and use these objects and tools, deploying
their skills, utterances, and the items to regulate their activity
and perhaps achieve a common purpose such as constructing
a house (cf. [8]), thus enacting an interaction game.
The acquisition of these behaviours by the learner agent
must proceed via stages of coarse-level to finer level under-
standing both of the behavioural goals of the participants, and
of the linguistic means deployed in achieving them. Similarly,
a small child who enters the world of, e.g., ‘breakfast’ and
learns what others at the table or doing and how to get what
it wants in this context by integrating language and action,
needs to master behavioural and linguistic skills, which may
start at a level of coarse understanding of the purpose of the
game (eating breakfast with the family) and holistic linguistic
phrases (‘hungry’, ‘gimme’), that develops in the course of
long-term, habitual interaction in fine-grained mastery of the
skills and behaviours (eating cereal with spoon, drinking from
a cup in one’s own hands without spilling, etc.) as well as
compositional language (‘I don’t want eggs!’, ‘Please pass the
milk’, etc.). This movement from the coarse- to fine- graining
in acquisition of habits, skills and behaviours via recurrent
interaction in interaction games is a current topic of our
research. Moreover, transfer, accommodation, and integration
of action, language, and skills from other contexts plays a key
role in this ontogeny.
VI. ENACTIVE ACQUISITION OF LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOURS
BY A CHILD-LIKE HUMANOID ROBOT INTERACTING WITH
NAIVE PARTICIPANTS
Adopting Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, whereby
interaction partners engage in a “form of life”, i.e. use
interaction and speech to enact joint embodied activity, we
have applied minimal social robotics principles and a social
learning architecture to allow our childlike humanoid iCub
robot DeeChee to acquire rudimentary linguistic capabilities.
This approach takes intersubjective interaction as central and
does not assume any a priori division of the dynamics via
some agent-partner-environment ontology, rather it allows
language and interaction game dynamics to emerge cutting
across these often unhelpful categories. Nonverbal, prosodic,
and social cues, embodied physical presence and sensorimotor
experience, and regulation of interaction, together with manip-
ulation of objects in context, help to scaffold the acquisition
of linguistic capabilities by the robot interacting with naive
participants in embodied learning scenarios. Success of the
system in this approach equates to successful engagement by
the humanoid in language games with human participants.
Using this enactive social learning approach, DeeChee has
acquired (1) the phonetic structure of salient words referring to
objects whose names are being taught by participants in real-
time interaction; and over a series of sessions of interaction:
(2) capability to correctly use learned lexical items to refer
Fig. 4. The interaction partner prohibits the robot DeeChee from reaching
the forbidden object physically and verbally, allowing the learning robot to
associate this experience with the spoken “No”. (Photo by Frank Fo¨rster, who
led the work on linguistic negation).
to manipulated objects and their properties, as validated by
grounded usage in context with participants (and also by
assessment of internal sensorimotor associations); (3) one-,
two- and sometimes multi-word utterances used meaningfully
in the context of this teaching scenario; and also (4) capability
to use a variety of forms of linguistic negation.
A. Grounding Meaningful Utterances
Another cognitive architecture ROSSUM, developed by Joe
Saunders and later Frank Fo¨rster in our lab, uses information
gain in sensorimotor experience and also prosodic cues from
speech of naive participants to learn and contextually select
motor actions by the robot that linguistically manipulate the
interaction, i.e. the utterance of words heard previously in
interaction games. This gives rise the grounded learning and
meaningful use of words in the context of recurring interac-
tions [34], [50].
B. Two-Word Stage in Linguistic Development
Extension of this work to allow the utterances of more than
one word by Saunders et al. [35] leads to the meaningful use
of two- or multiword utterances appropriate to experiential
context that have a protogrammatical structure, similar to the
two-word stage in linguistic development of human children.
C. Emergence of Linguistic Negation
Longstanding hypotheses on human development (e.g. Kaye
[24]; cf. Tomasello [51]) assert that human infants develop
into communicating languaging individuals in their first two
years in large part due to being treated as intersubjective,
intentional, communicative agents, and that this in fact is
needed for them to become such agents, even though much
of their behaviour may lack these characteristics at the start.
However, through habitual interaction in which they are treated
this way, infants do in fact become communicative persons.
Following Wittgenstein [8], language usage reflecting a form
of practice in life arises in interaction games, and such ap-
propriate usage of language in embodied contexts, rather than
mere truth-functional semantics giving so-called ‘meaning’,
gives utterances their meaning in human experience. In the
work here, focusing on enaction and interaction (cf. Varela
et al. [9]), we have an existence proof that development of
the use of linguistic negation is possible in a humanoid which
is successful at least in some limited contexts of interaction
games in Wittgenstein’s sense of engaging. Results from
a rejective scenario show how expressing rejective affect-
motivational expressive behaviour in a child-like humanoid can
evoke various forms of negation from naive human interaction
partners in embodied interactions with the robot. Association
of prosodically salient words from the participants’ speech
with the experience (operationally defined as the flow of
values over the sensorimotor-motivational variables of the
robot [43], [44]) and triggering the utterance of these words in
the humanoid’s speech under similar experience leads in the
dyadic interactions to acquisition and linguistic expression of
various forms of linguistic negation by the robot.
From the viewpoint of the participant or an adult speaker,
the robot engages in uses of negation which appear to have
the function of not only rejective negation but also other
forms (even truth-functional negation). Participants appear to
understand and respond to the robot’s behaviour and utterances
as intentional, and appear to engage with the linguistically
developing robot in a manner presuming and maintaining
intersubjective engagement. Figures 5, 6, and 7 give excerpts
in conversation analysis notation (following a situationally
extended version of Jefferson notation [52]) of an interaction
between the humanoid DeeChee and a (naive) human in the 5th
session of teaching DeeChee the names of shapes. Participants
were unaware that negation acquisition was being studied.
Acquisition by the robot of words and contextual sensori-
motor experiential triggers for their usage proceeded along
independent trajectories for the various participants. DeeChee
exhibits valanced motivational responses to the various objects.
The human’s utterances include many forms of negatives,
e.g. truth-functional negation in Figure 6. Extracts show the
robot uttering negative words, interpreted in the interaction
game, e.g as motivation-dependent denial (Figure 5) and truth-
functional negation (Figure 7), among many other classified
types of negation. The “head-shaking” in Fig. 5 is an emergent
consequence of an interaction between the robot turning to
avoid the object toward which it has negative motivational
valence and the human continually moving the object into the
robot’s visual field.
In several example developmental trajectories of the robot in
embodied interaction with different human participants in the
rejective negation scenario, this leads in just a few sessions
to the expression by the child-like humanoid of an array
of types of what functions as and is construed as linguistic
negation in the interaction. Strikingly, in these experiments
the robot is responding on the basis of its current and prior
sensorimotor-motivational experience and its prior experience
of the interaction game with the participant; however it did
Fig. 5. Negation Experiments: Motivation-Dependent Denial exhibited by
the child-like humanoid iCub robot DeeChee. R marks the robot’s utterances
(line 124) and P the human participant’s when there is a change of speaker.
Fig. 6. Negation Experiments: Truth-Functional Denial exhibited by the
Human engaging in a teaching scenario interaction game with DeeChee. R
marks the robot’s utterance (line19) and P the human participant’s when there
is a change of speaker.
not hear the speech of the participant in real-time, but only
learned from the participant’s speech associated to the rest of
its sensorimotor experience between sessions. Further studies
characterize these trajectories in more detail than outlined
above, and also compare the effect of additional exposure to
prohibitive negation (see Figure 4) on the distribution and
dynamics of usage of negation in human-robot interaction
learning scenarios [37].
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
We have employed experiential intelligence in enactive
cognitive architectures for the acquisition via information-
theoretic self-structuring of sensory fields and self-
organization of sensorimotor control, as well as for socially
regulated and embedded behaviours, including skills acquired
by imitation, development of turn-taking and autonomous
selection of behaviour in response to social contingency and
engagement in habitual learning via long-term human-robot
interactions. We have shown how aspects of language as
motor activity in such contexts, including grounded reference,
two-word utterance, and negation can be acquired using a
radically enactive approach. More general learning of these
interaction games by making use of teleological understanding
[53] in contexts of habitual purposeful engagement is the
usual context of child language development, and also
the arena of meaningful language use. We aim to further
emulate this development in humanoid robots by continuing
to harness information self-structuring and insights of the
enactive paradigm.
Fig. 7. Negation Experiments: Truth-Functional Denial (line 107) and
Negative Agreement (line 114) exhibited by the humanoid robot DeeChee.
R marks the robot’s utterances and P the human participant’s when there is a
change of speaker.
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